http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/asia/china-us-history-john-pomfret.html?mabReward=CTM&recp=7&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&region=CColumn&module=Recommendation&src=rechp&WT.nav=RecEngine

In the History of U.S.-China Relations, a Pattern of Enchantment and Despair

By EDWARD WONG  NOV. 24, 2016

What has been the overarching paradigm of United States-China relations from the 18th century to now?

Americans and Chinese have been enchanting each other and disappointing each other since they first met in 1784, when the first U.S. ship landed in Guangzhou with a cargo of American-grown ginseng and silver to trade for tea. If there’s a pattern to the relationship, it has been rapturous enchantment followed by despair. Right now, Americans are in the disenchantment phase of the cycle, as are the Chinese.

You tell many colorful anecdotes of Americans and Chinese in contact with each other. Which one do you think best reflects the wider story?

One of the main goals of the book was to bring to light stories of unchronicled influence on both sides. The first American minister to the Qing court in Beijing was a young Republican named Anson Burlingame. Burlingame was a radical abolitionist who was dispatched to Beijing by the Lincoln administration.

Burlingame believed that the West needed to give China time to develop and modernize and stop pressuring China to change. He believed that the West had no right to criticize, for example, the way China treated Chinese Christians, and he argued that Western officials should tolerate the Chinese habit of maintaining that their emperor actually ruled the entire world.

To me, Burlingame encapsulates one side of the American view of China, one that reappeared in the 1970s and lasted up through the beginning of the Obama administration — the idea, or rather the bet — that China would liberalize and become more like us as long as we facilitated its rise. In opposition to Burlingame, other Americans believed his views on China were, as one of his successors in Beijing put it, a “hallucination.” That also has formed a key part of the American perspective on China.

Your book discusses the way governments in the two nations have interacted with each other, but you also go into detail on the roles that notable nonpolitical figures have played. To what extent does the United States-China relationship depend on the attitudes of each countries’ leaders versus those of other citizens, whether they are from the elite classes or the grass roots?

In many ways, we and the Chinese, and our governments, elites and those from the grass roots, are captives of our past.

In the beginning of the relationship, individual Americans and Chinese created the relationship and imbued it with much of its meaning. American merchants and missionaries saw China as a vast market for stuff and for souls. Chinese saw America as a place that could save China from the depredations of other imperialist nations and, with its world-class educational system, as a model for China to emulate. At the same time, other groups of Americans feared the Chinese and, starting in the late 1870s, oppressed Chinese workers in America, starting a long history of fearing the industriousness of the Chinese.

Chinese had their own prejudices against Americans and American ideas as well, viewing them as immoral, sexually deviant and dangerous. Many of these dreams and nightmares, fantasies and biases we have about each other have resurfaced in subsequent decades. In Donald Trump’s claim that China has been “raping” the United Stateswhen it comes to trade, one can hear the populists of the California Workingmen’s Party in late 19th-century California railing on the streets of San Francisco against “the heathen Chinese.”

In your many years as a journalist in China, what were the most notable changes you saw in the United States-China relationship?

With China’s rise, Beijing is less willing to bend to Washington’s will than before and more willing to aggressively pursue its interests, whether they involve trade or the South China Sea. Washington spent decades arguing that as China strengthened it would become more like a liberal Western nation. It hasn’t turned out that way, and as such the U.S. has stopped doing China any favors. Much more than before, it is blocking the sales of Western companies to Chinese firms and strengthening its alliances with nations around China’s periphery. The careful balance of containment and engagement that defined America’s policy toward China is now heavily skewed toward containment.

What are your thoughts on President Xi Jinping’s worldview and how the United States fits into that?

Xi Jinping has said he wants Asians to rule Asia, which I think can be translated into a desire to see China rule Asia. In this view, the U.S. is an interloper and would do best to retreat to Hawaii and let China handle the western Pacific. China benefited greatly from the Pax Americana in the Pacific, but now Xi feels that China does not need the U.S. to protect it anymore. It wants the U.S. out of Asia. Not next year, not the year after, but one day soon.

With the election of Donald Trump as the next United States president, where do you see the relationship going?

Trump is not an outlier when it comes to his views on China. They are contradictory, but so were Obama’s and those of many of his predecessors.

During the campaign, Trump seesawed between accusing China of “raping” the United States on trade, threatening to walk away from America’s alliances in East Asia — and thereby ceding the western Pacific to Beijing — and mulling the idea of some type of “grand bargain” with China where the U.S. would accept China’s rise if China did not endanger the status quo in Asia.

Trump will enter office against a backdrop of an Asia facing a nuclear-armed dictator in North Korea and a China eager to capitalize on American missteps. How he juggles America’s — and his own — competing mix of enchantment, disappointment and self-interested realism about China will help determine the future of the relationship and the future of the globe. If I had to guess, I think he is going to be more pragmatic than many initially thought, but prognostication is a tough business, especially when it comes to China and Donald Trump.


http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20161125/china-us-history-john-pomfret/zh-hant/?action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&module=Translations&region=Header&version=zh-CN&ref=en-US&pgtype=article

200年來,中美怎樣相互吸引又彼此失望

黃安偉 2016年11月25日

記者潘文(John Pomfret)在中國有著豐富經驗,在其第二本書中,他對從1776年至今的美中關係這個宏大題材進行了細緻入微的研究。隨著美中關係壓力不斷增長、兩國均出現強人領袖,《美國與中國》(The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom)一書的出版正逢這個充滿不確定性的轉折點。從廣東富豪伍秉鑒(Howqua)到美國著名密碼學家赫伯特·亞德利(Herbert Yardley),再到美國前財政部長小亨利·M·保爾森(Henry M. Paulson Jr.),潘文用各種各樣的人物追溯了一段悠久歷史。

潘文將於下週二在華盛頓的「政治與散文」(Politics and Prose)書店介紹他的書。在訪談中,他探討了中美兩國互動的歷史、國家主席習近平的世界觀,以及川普政府可能採取什麼樣的中國政策。

從18世紀到現在,美中關係的主要模式是什麼?

1784年,第一艘美國貨輪抵達廣州,船上載有美國產的花旗參和用來購買茶葉的銀子。從那時的首次見面起,美國人和中國人就一直在為對方著迷、也在令對方失望。如果說美中關係有一種模式的話,那就是狂熱著迷之後緊隨而來的絕望。目前,美國人正處於這一週期的失望階段,中國人也是如此。

你講述了許多美國人和中國人相互接觸時發生的豐富多彩的軼事。你認為哪一個最能反映其背後更為廣泛的歷史?

這本書的主要目的之一,是讓人了解兩國未被載入史冊的有影響的故事。美國派駐北京清廷的第一位公使,是一位名叫蒲安臣(Anson Burlingame)的年輕共和黨人。蒲安臣是一位激進的廢奴主義者,是林肯政府把他派往北京的。

蒲安臣認為,西方需要給中國時間讓其發展和現代化,而不是用壓力迫使中國改變。例如他認為西方沒有權利批評中國對待中國基督徒的方式,他還認為西方官員應該容忍中國人的習慣,讓他們一直認為自己的皇帝實際上統治著整個世界。

在我看來,蒲安臣概括了美國對中國看法的一面,這一面在20世紀70年代重新出現,並且一直持續到歐巴馬政府開始不久的時候。這種看法、或者說這種賭注認為只要我們為中國崛起助一臂之力,中國就會實現自由化,將會變得更像我們一樣。也有美國人反對蒲安臣,用蒲安臣在北京的一位繼任者的話來說,他對中國的看法是一種「幻覺」。這也是美國對中國看法的一個關鍵部分。

你的書討論了兩國在政府層面互動的方式,但你也詳細介紹了值得注意的非政治人物在其中所發揮的作用。美中關係在多大程度上取決於各自國家的領導人的態度,又在多大程度上取決於該國公民的態度,無論公民來自精英階層還是基層

在許多方面,我們和中國人,我們的政府、精英層,以及那些來自基層的人,都不能逃脫我們的過去。

美中關係開始時,兩國關係是美國和中國的個人締造的,這些個人賦予了美中關係大部分的意義。美國商人和傳教士把中國看作是一個東西和靈魂的廣大市場。中國人則把美國看作是一個可以拯救中國免遭其他帝國主義國家蹂躪的國家,美國有世界一流的教育體制,是中國應該模仿的榜樣。與此同時,有些美國人害怕中國人,他們從19世紀70年代末開始壓制在美國的中國工人,就此開啟一個恐懼中國人的勤勞的漫長歷史。

中國人對美國人及美國觀念也有自己的偏見,認為其不道德、性行為越軌,而且頗為危險。在後來的幾十年裡,許多這些夢想和噩夢、以及我們對彼此的幻想和偏見都再次浮出水面。唐納德·川普聲稱中國在貿易方面一直在「強姦」美國的說法,讓人想起加州19世紀後期,在舊金山大街上大聲抗議「異教徒中國佬」的那些加利福尼亞工人黨的民粹主義者。

你在中國當記者的多年時間裡,在美中關係中看到的最顯著的變化是什麼?

隨著中國的崛起,北京已不願意屈從於華盛頓的意願,而更願意積極追求自己的利益,無論是在貿易上、還是在南中國海。華盛頓幾十年來一直認為,隨著中國的強大,它會變得更像一個自由的西方國家,但中國並沒有變成那樣。因此美國已經不再讓中國得到任何好處。與以往相比,現在美國更是要阻礙中國公司收購西方企業,也要加強其與中國周邊國家的聯盟。遏制與接觸的微妙平衡曾是美國對中國政策的定義,如今這種平衡已經打破,變為嚴重地偏向遏制。

你對習近平的世界觀有什麼看法?美國在其中處於什麼位置?

習近平已經表示,他希望亞洲人統治亞洲,我覺得這個說法可以理解為希望看到中國統治亞洲。按照這個觀點,美國是闖入者,最好能撤回夏威夷,讓中國處理西太平洋事務。中國在太平洋地區的美式和平中得到很多好處,但現在習近平認為,中國不再需要美國的保護了。中國希望美國離開亞洲。不是明年,也不是後年,但在不遠的將來。

隨著唐納德·川普當選下任美國總統,你覺得美中關係將走向何方?

就川普對中國的看法而言,他的說法並不離奇。他的說法是矛盾的,但歐巴馬及其許多前任的說法也都是矛盾的。

在競選期間,川普在兩個極端之間不斷反覆,一會兒指責中國在貿易上「強姦」美國,威脅要讓美國撤出其與東亞的聯盟、從而把西太平洋送給北京;一會兒又提出與中國進行某種「大交易」的想法,如果中國不危及亞洲的現狀,美國將接受中國的崛起。

川普將在這樣一種背景下就任總統:亞洲正面臨一個擁有核武器的朝鮮獨裁者,中國渴望從美國的失誤中獲得更多的好處。他如何同時應對美國以及他本人在中國問題上那些著迷、失望和利己現實主義的競爭組合,將有助於確定美中關係、乃至全球的未來。如果我不得不猜測的話,我認為他會更務實,務實程度會超過許多人最初認為的那樣,但很難預言,特別是當涉及到中國和唐納德·川普的時候。